Did Hamas change its 1988 Charter in 2017? Have Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip supported Hamas following October 7? I provide some answers below.
Victorian authors occasionally used a proverb that they ascribed, correctly or not, to an Arab fable: “Don’t let the camel get its nose under the tent!” In his Book of Fables and Folk Stories, Horace E. Scudder tells the following:
One cold night, as an Arab sat in his tent, a Camel thrust the flap of the tent aside, and looked in.
"I pray thee, master," he said, "let me put my head within the tent, for it is cold without."
"By all means, and welcome," said the Arab; and the Camel stretched his head into the tent.
"If I might but warm my neck, also," he said, presently.
"Put your neck inside," said the Arab. Soon the Camel, who had been turning his head from side to side, said again:—
"It will take but little more room if I put my fore legs within the tent. It is difficult standing without."
"You may also put your fore legs within," said the Arab, moving a little to make room, for the tent was very small.
"May I not stand wholly within?" asked the Camel, finally. "I keep the tent open by standing as I do."
"Yes, yes," said the Arab. "I will have pity on you as well as on myself. Come wholly inside."
So the Camel came forward and crowded into the tent. But the tent was too small for both.
"I think," said the Camel, "that there is not room for both of us here. It will be best for you to stand outside, as you are the smaller; there will then be room enough for me."
And with that he pushed the Arab a little, who made haste to get outside the tent.
It is a wise rule to resist the beginnings of evil.
The first thing I learned when I entered the tent for my debate on the Gaza war was that a cold sunny day in Hay-on-Wye, Wales, cannot resist the greenhouse effect. The second thing I (should have) learned is that in our age, the Shakespearean “world’s a stage” has turned into a gladiator’s arena. Ours is no longer a “big tent” of ideas but a narrow one of clashing identities, where each newcomer may be suspected to be a camel chameleon, evil in disguise. I leave it to another post to discuss whether this is good or bad, how we got here, and what we can and should do about it.
But for now, recalling my nose under the tent, here’s the debate, part of the wonderful IAI HowTheLightGetsIn festival, with Journalist Myriam François.
The first thing I realized upon watching this clip is that even at my best, I may do only slightly better than Biden in his 2024 presidential debate, and, not yet resigning, probably worse. The second thing I realized is that I should address the factual bones of contention in this segment, as I’ve heard both battled over since the start of the war: one regarding the so-called “2017 Hamas Charter,” another about Palestinian public opinion according to wartime polls. Considering the title of the debate, “Truth in Conflict,” it might be useful to provide some detailed comments.
So below are some sections from Nemeses, my current book-in-progress about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war.
2017 Hamas Charter?
Many refer to the “2017 Hamas charter,” but Hamas never did. Its title is intentionally prosaic: A Document of General Principles and Policies. The 1988 Hamas Charter used the Arabic word for “covenant” [ميثاق (mithaq)], akin to the 1964/68 Palestinian National Covenant, which carries foundational and ideological weight; in 2017 Hamas opted for وثيقة (wathiqa), meaning “document, paper, instrument.”
Khaled Mash’al, then chairman of Hamas’s politburo, announced the Document at a press conference at a luxurious hotel in Doha, Qatar. He clarified that the 1988 Charter could not be considered obsolete: “Our principle is the following: no change of document. Hamas does not forget its past,” reasoning that facing accusations of immobilism (joumoud) and dissolution (mouyou’), the Document outlines a median position (wasatiyya) (Seurat 2022: 18).
Hamas started working on the Document in the wake of the 2013 Egyptian popular uprising and coup d'etat against President Mohamed Morsi, the rise of el-Sisi, and the clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). After years of work and consultation with international legal experts, Hamas released the Document highlighting the organization’s national(ist) agenda while diluting the Charter’s stress on religious calling. The Document notably avoids the Charter’s antisemitic and genocidal message and its MB connection (in the 1988 Charter, Hamas affirmed its ties to the MB by mentioning it six times).
The Document equivocates about its goals. On the one hand, it “regards the establishment of a fully sovereign independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital in the June 4, 1967 lines, and the return of the refugees and the uprooted individuals to the homes from which they were expelled, as a national, agreed-upon, and joint formula.” (This may indeed reflect mainstream PLO).
On the other hand, the Document affirms that Israel’s existence (“the Zionist entity”) is “null and void,” as are its international legal foundations (“the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate Document, the UN Palestine Partition Resolution, and whatever resolutions and measures that derive from them”), that “armed struggle” is the “first and foremost… strategic choice” of resistance, which is “assured by the divine laws and by the international laws.” It further states that “Hamas rejects any alternative to the complete liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea.”
Notably, a week after announcing the Document, Mash’al stepped down from his position amidst a shift in the balance of power: the scale was tipping from the political bureau in exile to the military wing in the Gaza Strip. “Taking place only a week before the transition of power, [the Document] was likely a way for the incumbent leaders, notably Meshaal himself, to put his legacy in ink and try to commit the incoming leadership to his policies” (Brenner 2017: 209).
While Hamas’s inner wrangling and its relations with Arab actors (especially el-Sisi) drove the Document, the latter mostly helped the organization’s public relations. The distinction between a formal charter and the Document was lost on many, whether anti-Hamas, like the ADL, or neutral, like Wikipedia, which designates it as the “2017 Hamas charter.” Apologists for Hamas, who often veil their antisemitism with anti-Zionism, were quick to leverage the Document to portray Hamas as a reformed, legitimate resistance. I leave it to the readers to consider the moral merits of the Document’s pledge for armed politicide of Israel and the implicit mass murder and deportation of Israeli Jews.
As for Mash’al (2024), in the wake of the Oct7 Al-Aqsa Flood, he did not forget to “thank the great student Flood, which emerged from the American, European, and Western universities… We have an opportunity to change the world, and to make Palestine a blessing to Mankind, by annihilating the Zionists and their sinful enterprise… We want a media Flood that will deliver its message. We want the truthful Palestinian narrative to reach far and to control all social media platforms and all forums… Today, the Islamic nation is obligated to join this blessed Jihadi Flood. When it does, we will see wonders… It is good for Mankind, because annihilating the Zionists is good for humanity as a whole.”
Ah, well, all's well, he said “Zionists,” not “Jews.”
References
Brenner, Björn. 2017. Gaza under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
Mashal, Khaled. 2024. “We Thank the Great 'Student Flood' at American Universities” (May 18, 2024). Facebook: Global Coalition for Quds and Palestine
Seurat, Leila. 2022. The Foreign Policy of Hamas: Ideology, Decision Making and Political Supremacy. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Polls
In the wake of Oct7, two major Palestinian pollsters ran surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: The Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) was the first, surveying October 31 to November 7; it was followed by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), 22 November-2 December 2023. Both indicate wide support for Hamas’s attack (AWRAD 75%; PCPSR 72%), with far larger support in the West Bank than in Gaza. Very similar proportions in both polls view Hamas favorably, while Fatah had the support of a fifth and the PNA of just a tenth.
Asked for what they would vote if new parliamentary elections were held, 51% opted for Hamas, 19% for Fatah, and 54% believed that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people (PSPSR). Still, in the aftermath of the election, 72% preferred to see a “national unity government” (AWRAD).
As for the desired end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, PSPSR indicates that a third supports the two-state solution, and a third opts for one-state. Given a third option, AWRAD suggests that 75% favored “a Palestinian state from the river to the sea” over having both peoples coexist either in a two-state solution (17%) or a one-state (5%) solution.
There are other interesting findings. AWRAD indicates most see the war as “between Israel and Palestinians in general” (64%) rather than between “Israel and Hamas” (19%). A consensus (95%-99%) said they would never forgive Israel for this war, which made them proud(er) of being Palestinians. 73% were certain the Palestinians will “emerge victorious from this war.” PSPSR indicates a clear majority (63%) supports “armed struggle” to achieve political goals. Nearly all refuse to believe/admit Hamas killed women and children; only 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) said it did. Tellingly, 85% said that “they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians.”
Subsequent polls register some, mostly slight, changes. According to PSPSR, Support for the Oct7 attack declined from 72% to 67% in June 2024; support for armed struggle declined to 54%. Even nine months after the Oct7 massacre, still only 7% said Hamas killed women and children, and 90% said they had not watched the videos of the killings.
A clear majority (61%) prefer Hamas rules Gaza (71% in the West Bank, 46% in Gaza). While Hamas still leads electorally, if Marwan Barghouti replaces Mahmud Abbas, Fatah may trump Hamas (44% to 29% in May 2024).
Hamas is one camel chameleon I wouldn’t let into any tent; Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians, are not.
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